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2ABSTRACT
Some commentators have suggested that employers who modernise their factory
operations will become dependent on the skills and attitudes of their employees. Others go
beyond this and suggest that workers in modernised firms will be persuaded to go 'beyond
contract' due to the emergence of a strong and direct form of attachment to their employer.
Moreover, with 'us and them' attitudes removed, it is uncertain what effect this may have on
workers' attitudes to the union. This paper puts these debates about factory modernisation
and workers' attitudes to the employer and the union to the test using detailed data from the
Brazilian white goods industry during the 1990s.
The research suggests the following in respect to this 'axis of allegiance'. First,
workers can be persuaded to think in terms of an effort bargain which includes issues
beyond just remuneration. Many employees are also taking a more inward-looking, 'employer
positive' approach. However, their degree of attachment to the modernised firm is both
limited and contingent on future, expected benefits.
Secondly, in terms of the worker-union relation, the cynicism of Brazilian workers to
unions may have been heightened by the policies of the modernising firm. While part of this
result may be due to the modernising firms' selection policies, the union's 'electorate' may
also have shifted its priorities. Despite this, many workers would still like unions to have an
active and independent role. Yet this is dependent on union policies being directed towards
the promotion of worker's key (and often new) workplace concerns.
Finally, while these results are influenced by the Brazilian context they do raise
questions about the attitudinal and behavioural underpinnings of modernisation in any
environment. As long as employers act to minimise the risk to which they may become more
dependent on workers, employee behaviour will, at best, only appear to indicate that they
have more allegiance to the employer. Moreover, workers' concerns about workplace
modernisation policies suggest that unions may not necessarily become more ineffectual and
irrelevant.
31.0 INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s a number of commentators suggested that employers who
modernise their management and workplace systems might become more dependent on the
skills and attitudes of their employees1. Yet the frequent observation that more sophisticated
labour control mechanisms have evolved questions the implication that work and work
attitudes will ‘improve’ to any great extent within the modernising firm2. Nevertheless, other
writers go beyond a belief in the attitudinal effects of changes to work per se. They suggest
that workers at modernised firms will be persuaded to go ‘beyond contract’ due to the
emergence of a strong and direct form of attachment to their employer3. Moreover, with ‘us
and them’ attitudes removed, it is uncertain what effect this may have on workers’ attitudes to
their union.
The purpose of this paper is to test these debates about employer dependence and
workers’ attitudes to the employer and their union. Has the employer really become more
open and democratic and has the ‘axis of allegiance’ shifted in the way optimists suggest?
More specifically, to what degree are workers more attached to their employer and does this
also suggest that the union may become increasingly irrelevant to workers within this new,
‘Mutual Gains’ enterprise?
The context for the study from which this paper draws is the Brazilian White Goods
industry during the 1990s4. Within this study, the testing of hypotheses about changes to
work and attitudes to the employer and union were based on a comparison of workers’
responses in firms which have changed little with those which have modernised in a most
comprehensive way. This data is drawn from intensive interviews with nearly 100 workers
from four white goods companies.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2.0 defines the concepts in question and
summarises the arguments of a number of prominent US and UK authors in these areas of
research. Section 3.0 provides an overview of how these issues of employer dependence
and worker allegiance have been seen within the Brazilian context. Section 4.0, on the other
hand, summarises the nature of modernisation policy and practice at the case study firms,
particularly at those who have modernised in a most comprehensive way. The ambiguities
which this review leaves, in terms of employer policy and changes to work, means that the
optimistic modernisation argument must be based on changing attitudes to the employer
(and union).
Accordingly, Section 5.0 presents primary evidence about whether and how workers’
attitudes to the employer and union have changed as a result of the modernisation process.
Subsection 5.1 reviews workers’ responses to questions such as - whether their employer
has more interest, what they have and might gain and the probability that they might leave
the firm. On the other hand, subsection 5.2 reveals how workers rate their union and in what
they want their unions to become involved. Section 6.0 summarises and concludes the
paper.
                                                          
1 Well known works include - J. Womack, D. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World, (New
York, 1990) and N. Oliver and B. Wilkinson, The Japanisation of British Industry, (Oxford, 1988/92).
2 As discussed in Section 2 of this paper.
3 Principle authors along this line referred to in this paper are – J. Lincoln and A. Kallenberg, Culture, Control and
Commitment, (Cambridge, 1989), T. Kochan and P. Osterman, The Mutual Gains Enterprise, (Boston, 1994) and
E. Applebaum and R. Batt, The New American Workplace, (New York, 1994).
4 L. Pegler, ‘Workers, Unions and the “Politics of Modernisation”: Labour Process Change in the Brazilian White
Goods Industry’, (2000), Phd Thesis, LSE, University of London.
42.0 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS
According to optimists, the ‘factory of the future’ represents a substantial
modernisation of management strategy and structures as well as significant changes to the
shopfloor5. As discussed by these authors, at the management level this implies the
promotion of quality and continuous improvement through a new mission statement and
through simpler organisational structures and more generous and democratic human
resource policies and incentive systems. At the shopfloor, modernisation involves new
production technologies and techniques and a new model of work. In this regard, optimists
argue that work will be based on greater levels of responsibility and autonomy and improved
employee conditions (e.g. expanded training) and employee relations (e.g. new forms of
involvement)6.
This schema is based on the apparently simple idea that modernisation will lead to a
change in attitudes and that this will feed through into improved company performance.
There are three major causal links within this idea7. The first is that modernisation policies
change the nature of work and attitudes to work. The second is that these policies will alter
the degree of worker attachment to the firm (and to the union). The third is that, due to these
changing attitudes, unions must alter their approach to continue to be representative and
effective bodies. To optimists, the concept of ‘us and them’ is no longer relevant. Firms will
become more dependent on workers’ attitudes and skills, workers will show more allegiance
to the firm and unions have to modify their behaviour (i.e. become moderate) so that they
don’t now become the ‘them’ in workers’ eyes8.
This paper focuses on the second of these linkages. This is because, while early
works focussed on the relation between changes to work, work attitudes and firm
performance (i.e. the first link), more recent literature seriously questions this hypothesis.
Significant question marks have been raised over whether job satisfaction filters through into
firm performance and in fact over how much workers actually like their new tasks, even in
Japan9. Consequently, more recent optimists focus more clearly on attitudes to the employer
(and union) as a result of modernisation policies10.
What then does the international literature suggest in terms of the new, more open,
dependent employer? Moreover, has there been a shift in the ‘axis of worker allegiance’
towards the employer and away from the union? In the first case, the debate about whether
employers have become more dependent on workers as a result of modernisation can be
divided into two schools of thought – the optimists and the pessimists.
A number of the optimists who have focussed their attention on the effects of
modernisation on attitudes to the employer make use of broad, integrated models of
company change. Concepts such as the ‘Mutual Gains Enterprise’11, ‘US Team Production’12
                                                          
5 See, in particular, on the following summary of the elements of the composite model – Kochan and Osterman,
Mutual Gains, pp45-58.
6 See footnote 3. However, the classic writers on these work themes were of course – M. Piore and C. Sabel, The
Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity, (New York, 1984).
7 A point succinctly made in Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture, p4.
8 Another key protagonist on this last union point is – M. Piore, ‘Unions: A Reorientation To Survive’ in Labor
Economics and Industrial Relations, eds. C. Kerr and P. Staudohar, (London, 1994), pp512-544.
9 Noted for the general literature in Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture, p4, p25 and for their study of Japan/US as
summarised in Ch. 9. In fact, past international reviews note that job satisfaction has strong links to reduced
turnover and absenteeism and not to company allegiance or performance (D. Guest, ‘Human Resource
Management and Industrial Relations’, Journal of Management Studies, (1987), 24, 5, p513-514 and D. Guest
and P. Dewe, ‘Company or Trade Union’: Which wins worker allegiance?’ BJIR, (1991), 29, 1.
10 Discussed below.
11 Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains
12 Appelbaum and Batt, New Workplace
5and ‘Welfare Corporatism’13 have been suggested. Each of these concepts is based on the
company using an integrated set of strategic, HRM and workplace policies14. Moreover, each
of these authors either states or assumes that a comprehensive form of modernisation is
emerging.
However, the survey evidence that each author relies on is not very convincing.
Instances of firms adjusting their HRM, strategic and workplace policies in this way remain
quite rare15. The case study evidence used to support the ‘Mutual Gains Enterprise’ and ‘US
Team Production’ is not very convincing either16. The use of ‘best case’ examples (e.g.
Saturn, CAMMI, Xerox and Nissan) merely highlights their minority and key sector status.
Most other case studies reviewed demonstrate that, despite the rhetoric, employers are only
prepared to offer minor adjustments to involvement, participation and gains sharing. New
forms of training are often highly geared to specific functions of that firm or to attitudes to the
firm.
Other authors are more pessimistic. To them, most examples of modernisation will be
partial. This is due to the interaction of context and the lack of realism inherent in the
optimistic argument. Alternatively, where comprehensive examples arise, any drift towards
greater employer dependence on workers’ skills and attitudes will be countered by new and
more onerous forms of control than had been evident in earlier forms of factory regime. For
example, through detailed participant observation, Graham notes that what has evolved
within the comprehensively modernised factory is in fact a more complete system of
control17. The mechanisms through which her observations of enhanced monitoring, pressure
and reduced autonomy evolve include - the selection process, orientation and training, team
pressures and the technical JIT and line systems employed18.
Authors such as Garrahan and Stewart19, Rinehart et al20, Delbridge21 and Taylor et
al22 support such a view.  Where the prospect of greater employer dependence arises,
employers are frequently responding with more sophisticated and onerous forms of control23.
Moreover, historical, local and broader contextual factors play a crucial role in terms of the
type and degree of modernisation and control systems which emerge.
If, therefore, new factory systems can be characterised as more controlling, what
does this suggest about workers’ attitudes to the employer and the union? Following this, if
workers are subject to greater control what opportunities for resistance do they now have?
On these questions the literature can also be divided into an optimistic and a pessimistic
group.
                                                          
13 Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture
14 See for example, Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains, Ch3.
15 Discussed by these authors in – Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains, pp79-109 and Applebaum and Batt,
New Workplace, p57-68. Reviewed in Pegler, “Politics of Modernisation”, pp17-18.
16 Appelbaum and Batt, New Workplace, pp69-97, Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains, pp 58-77. Reviewed by
Pegler, “Politics of Modernisation”, pp18-20.
17 L. Graham, ‘How Does the Japanese Model Transfer to the United States? A View from the line’, in Global
Japanisation, eds. T. Elgar and C. Smith, (London, 1994), pp123-151.
18 Ibid., pp132-141.
19 P. Garrahan and P. Stewart, ‘Work Organisations in Transition: The Human Resource Management
Implications of the “Nissan Way”, Human Resource Management Journal, (1992), 2,2, pp 46-62.
20 J. Rinehart, D. Robertson, C. Huxley and J. Wareham, ‘Reunifying conception and execution of work under
Japanese production management: A Canadian Case Study”, in Global Japanisation, pp152-174.
21 R. Delbridge, ‘Surviving JIT: Control and Resistance in a Japanese Transplant’, Journal of Management
Studies–Special Issue, (1995), 32, 6, pp 803-817.
22 B. Taylor, T. Elgar, and P. Fairbrother, ‘Transplants and Emulators: The Fate of the Japanese Model in British
Electronics’, in Global Japanisation, pp196-225.
23 This would seem to fit with the third and more subtle form of power (control) suggested by, S. Lukes, Power – A
Radical View, (London, 1977).
6As suggested above, optimists believe that a greater degree of worker attachment
(commitment) to the firm will arise. One of the more convincing arguments for this can be
seen in Lincoln and Kallenberg’s comparative analysis of US and Japanese firms24.
Furthermore, it is important to note that many of these optimistic authors also argue that the
long-term survival of a comprehensive modernisation strategy requires the active role of
unions. Yet this implies that unions must be more supportive of the firm than is often the
case25. It also carries the implicit assumption that workers can maintain dual allegiance to
both company and union.
In stark contrast, pessimists such as Graham point to the pressure of the firm’s
policies on workers’ attitudes and behaviour26. Many workers do not believe in the firm’s
‘new’ message but are often constrained, by the transparency of the factory system, to
openly voice their concerns. Rinehart et al and others also note that some workers believe in
the new firm, some risk openly cynical behaviour whereas others act ‘as if’ they support the
firm and its policies27.
Transparent factory systems combined with the unitary message of the ‘new’ firm
mean that traditional forms of resistance (both inside and outside the factory) become more
difficult to sustain28. Within this type of situation, combative unions note the new difficulties
they encounter in their attempt to act as a ‘voice’ of workers29. This scenario also makes it
hard to imagine that workers could have dual allegiance to both union and company – a point
noted by past literature on dual allegiance30.
Following these points, more subtle types of workplace control policies may merely
aggravate the existing structural and representational problems which unions face31. For
example, workers may like some aspects of new factory systems (such as training, career
schemes etc) or they must act ‘as if’ they do. This may mean that the prospect that they will
turn to unions for support will become even more uncertain. The question of whether unions
must then adopt moderate or militant identities thus becomes more complex – particularly in
contexts where unions already face a harsh facilitating environment32.
In summary, this brief international overview of the employer dependence-worker
allegiance debate suggests a number of points in respect to the analysis of these issues in
Brazil. First, there is significant evidence to suggest that even when an employer embarks on
a comprehensive modernisation strategy they will respond to the prospect of their greater
dependence on workers with new and more subtle forms of control. Secondly, within this
environment workers may hold a variety of attitudes and demonstrate various behavioural
responses. This highlights the continuing interplay of consent, control, conflict and resistance
within the ‘factory of the future’. Finally, the form of modernisation plus the nature of
employer dependence and worker allegiance may vary significantly between contexts.
                                                          
24 Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture, Ch 9.
25 See, for example, ibid., pp 229-232
26 Graham, ‘A View from the line’, pp 141-147.
27 Rinehart et al, ‘A Canadian Case Study’, pp 164-165
28 Delbridge, ‘Surviving JIT’, pp 812-814.
29 Rinehart et al,’A Canadian Case Study’, pp 166-169.
30 See, for example, D.Guest, ‘Human Resource Management, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations’, in Human
Resource Management:: A Critical Text, ed. J. Storey, (London, 1995), pp112-117 and Lincoln and Kallenberg,
Culture, pp 23-24.
31 For an excellent discussion of these issues and the new problems created by factory modernisation see – P.
Ackers, C.Smith and P.Smith eds., The New Workplace and Trade Unionism, (London, 1996).
32 For a good discussion of union identity options see also – R. Hyman, ‘Changing Trade Union Identities and
Strategies’ in New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations, eds, R. Hyman and A. Ferner, (1994). The critical
role of context for union options and the allegiance debate is well discussed in S. Deery et al, ‘Predicting
Organisational and Union Commitment: The Effect of Industrial Relations Climate’ BJIR, (1994), 32, 4, pp581-
597.
7Accordingly, in preparation for the analysis of the case study firms in section 4, the next
section discusses the context surrounding recent modernisation experiments in Brazil.
3.0 EMPLOYER DEPENDENCE AND WORKER ALLEGIANCE IN THE BRAZILIAN
CONTEXT
The 1990s saw a significant growth in interest in the possible effects of modernisation
policies on industrial competitiveness and economic development in Brazil. Quality and
productivity have become dominant industry and Governmental catchcrys33. Academic
commentators have also become more positive about the potential benefits for work and
workers. However, this represents a vast change on the past. The quite exclusionary and
corporatist industrial relations model and its place within an authoritarian political system
meant that few could foresee changes such as those suggested by modernisation
optimists34.
The state based development model and the very encompassing set of rules
governing union and worker behaviour, which began in the 1930s, changed little up to the
mid-1980s35. While applied to different degrees by subsequent regimes, the industrial
relations model continued to be based on three ‘pillars’. These were – the regulatory role of
the Ministry of Labour, the Labour Code and related social welfare and labour court systems.
One of the effects of these codes and bodies was to determine, oversee and enforce
a model of unionism which made unions non-workplace based, social welfare administrators.
Various regulations governing union structures and finances and the normative powers of the
labour courts to curtail strikes meant that unionism at all levels was largely controlled. While
many basic statutory work benefits had been codified, workers were largely left to the whims
of a very paternalistic and authoritarian employer class for the determination of their
conditions36.
Economic constraints and social and political pressure starting in the late 1970s led to
a slow process of democratisation post 198537. While the economy and economic policy
oscillated considerable during the decade of the 1980s, in 1989 many of the constraints on
union and worker action were also relaxed38. However, the monopoly of representation of
local unions was retained, as was a system of automatic union financing. Moreover,
workplace representation rights (and other issues of importance to the ‘new union’
movement) remain uncertain and dependent on local bargaining. This has meant that unions
can still survive without having to be active and representative, particularly at the workplace
level.
                                                          
33 For example, in 1990 the Federal Government launched an assistance programme for quality and productivity
in industry along the lines suggested by optimistic theory (Ministério da Justiça et al – Programa Brasileiro da
Qualidade e Productividade, Brasília, 1990). One of the more optimistic Brazilian studies is – J. Gonçalves and
C.Dreyfus (coords), Reengenharia das Empressas – Passando a limpo, (São Paulo, 1995).
34 For a classic work on this history see – G. Gomes, The Roots of State Intervention in the Brazilian Economy,
(London, 1986).
35 The features of the model (described below) are not disputed in the literature. See, for example, K. Erikson,
The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics, (Berkeley, 1977) and M. Alves, ‘Trade Unions in
Brazil: A Search for Autonomy and Organisation’, in Labour Autonomy and the State in Latin America, ed. E.
Epstein, (Boston, 1989), pp 39-45.
36 See, for example, in terms of the military period, Alves, ‘Trade Unions in Brazil…’, pp 47-49.
37 See, M. Keck, ‘The New Unionism in the Brazilian Transition’, in Democratising Brazil: problems of transition
and consolidation, ed. A.Stepan, (London, 1989).
38 These issues are well discussed in – J. Morais, ‘New Unionism and Union Politics in Pernambuco (Brazil) in the
1980s’, (1992), Phd Thesis, LSE, University of London, pp 58-59.
8In the period up to the late 1970s a very tough, low wage, high turnover form of
workplace situation was observed by most Brazilian factory studies39. There was little
question of employer dependence. Yet studies of workers’ attitudes suggested that, if fair,
many workers had more confidence in a strong state than the broad, political and somewhat
distant objectives of much of the union movement prior to the late 1970s40.
In contrast, between the 1980s and late 1990s there were signs that this situation was
changing. First, up to the mid-1980s many factory studies characterised factory conditions as
‘routinised’41. This term encompassed relatively unfettered managerial prerogative to impose
– narrowly divided tasks, extensive labour substitution, low salaries and high turnover. A
major study of workers’ attitudes at this time confirmed that, while workers were often
fascinated by new technologies, there was a fear of substitution, powerlessness, more
onerous work conditions and general employer abuse42. While the situation in firms where
unions were more influential modified these experiences and opinions, there were widely
held suspicions that firms were making productivity gains at the expense of workers and that
worker autonomy was being progressively sacrificed.
Yet along with the progressive liberalisation of political and industrial relations
processes during the late 1980s, factory studies began to observe a more developed
modernisation model. The term ‘Taylorised Just in Time’ came to be used (by some) to
describe a partially modernised factory where workers were being given new tasks but within
which they continued to work under highly monitored and pressurised conditions43. An
important study of workers’ attitudes during this period thus confirmed many of the
pessimistic conclusions of the earlier study44 in terms of workers’ conditions and attitudes45. It
also signposted the possible increased use of ‘greenfields’ sites by modernising employers
and the greater confidence that an active union gave workers.
Despite the instabilities created by the greater opening up of the Brazilian economy in
the early 1990s, there were clear signs that a broader range of firms were beginning to apply
more comprehensive modernisation models46. While generally limited to large domestic firms
and TNC subsidiaries, employers appeared to be opening themselves up to the prospect of
greater dependency on the skills and attitudes of their employees. Workers were being given
more involvement, jobs were broader, training and other new conditions were being offered
and hierarchies and supervision levels were being reduced. Significant improvements in
quality, productivity, scrap levels and absenteeism also began to be reported more
frequently47.
                                                          
39 A classic study of workplace conditions up to this period is – J. Humphrey, Capitalist Control and Workers’
Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry, (Princeton, 1982).
40 See for a review of these studies – Y. Cohen, The Manipulation of Consent: The State and Working Class
Consciousness in Brazil, (Pittsburg, 1989), Ch 1 and for his study Chs 3-5. This type of union model, however,
came to change significantly with the emergence of the ‘new’ (more representative, factory focussed) union
movement from the late 1970s ( Keck, ‘ New Unionism..’.)
41 A term coined by A. Fleury, ‘Rotinização do Trabalho:O Caso das Indústrias Mecânicas’, in Organização do
Trabalho, eds. A. Fleury and N. Vargas, (São Paulo, 1982). See also, Humphrey, Capitalist Control.
42 L. Abramo, ‘A Subjectividade do Trabalhador Frente á Automação’ in Automação e Movimento Sindical no
Brasil, R. Neder et al, (São Paulo, 1988).
43 As suggested by J. Humphrey, ‘Adaptando o “Modelo Japones” ao Brasil’, in Sobre o Modelo Japones, org. H.
Hirata, (Sao Paulo, 1993), p 255-256.
44 Abramo, ‘A Subjectividade..’
45 M. Leite, O Futuro do Trabalho: Novos Tecnologias e Subjectividade Operária, (São Paulo, 1994).
46 For examples see – A. Fleury and J. Humphrey, ‘Human Resources and the Diffusion of and Adaptation of New
Quality Methods in Brazil’, IDS Research Report, 1993, 24 and J. Humphrey, “Japanese” Methods and the
Changing Position of Direct Production Workers: Evidence from Brazil’, in Global Japanisation, eds. T. Elgar and
C. Smith (London, 1994) and Gonçalves and Dreyfus, Reengenharia.
47 See – DIEESE, Política Industrial, Restructuração Produtiva e Organização do Trabalho – Indicadores e
Informaçôes Releventes, no.1, 5/95.
9However, there have been few studies of this more recent Brazilian modernisation
phase using detailed interviews with workers – particularly in terms of what they think of their
employer and union. Moreover, there are indications (i.e. due to the use of more stringent
selection and evaluation systems) that Brazilian modernisers are also responding to the
threat of their greater dependence through new systems of control48. The fact that
‘greenfields’ sites are being used and that unions are still not being involved would seem to
support this.
Due to this particular context, some authors have suggested that the recent stage of
Brazilian modernisation can be characterised as an ‘Implicit Bargain’ – a new bargain over
workplace conditions (in exchange for higher quality/productivity) is being made49. However,
due to past industrial relations traditions this is not an explicit trade-off. Following this, others
suggest that most employers will choose the ‘easiest’ (more limited and controlling)
modernisation path possible50. Accordingly, the best that can be expected in terms of
workers’ attitudes is consent.
On the other hand, weak unionism and the reputed passivity of Brazilian workers
might suggest that even an ‘easy’ modernisation strategy could lead to the levels of worker
allegiance that employers require for the levels of productivity and quality they desire.
However, the determination of the (more recent) relation between an employer's
modernisation model and the nature of worker allegiance requires a depth of information
about workers’ attitudes which has rarely been provided. Without such information optimists
may suggest that workers have allegiance while pessimists may suggest that ‘false
consciousness’ has a new form – workers are now dupes to the ‘quality’ policies of the
modernising firm.
The following sections of this paper apply original data to these questions. Section 5.0
looks at how a sample of workers from four comparable Brazilian firms feels about their
modernising employer and their union. The next section (4.0) sets the scene for this through
a brief review of the nature of modernisation at the case study firms. An important aspect of
this review is the question of how comprehensively modernising firms have responded to the
risk that they have become more dependent on the skills and attitudes of their employees.
4.0 MODERNISATION AT THE CASE STUDY FIRMS – POLICY AND PRACTICE
Four firms, from within the previously unstudied ‘White Goods’ industry, were chosen
as case studies. Two of these firms (three factories) produce refrigeration products and the
other two washing products (e.g. washing machines, clothes and dish dryers). While there
are important similarities amongst all the firms, the two by two grouping worked particularly
well. Each was of comparable size, each had virtually the same requirements of production
and one of each group appeared to be very advanced in its modernisation process while the
others could be called traditional or partial modernisers.  Broad characteristics of these case
studies are shown in Table 1 below.
                                                          
48 J. Humphrey, ‘The Adoption of Japanese Management Techniques in Brazilian Industry’, Journal of
Management Studies – Special Issue, (1995), 32, 6, pp 782
49 Fleury and Humphrey, ‘Human Resources…’, pp 36-42.
50 For example, see N. Castro, ‘Modernização e Trabalho no Complexo Automotivo Brasileiro – Restructuraçâo
Industrial ou Japanização de Ocasião?, Novos Estudos Cebrap, 1993, 37 and M. Leite, ‘Restrucuraçâo Produtiva,
Novos Tecnologias e Novas Formas de Gestão da Mão-de-Obra’, in O Mundo do Trabalho, orgs. C. Matosso et
al, (São Paulo, 1994).
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Table 1: Characteristics of the case studies
Firm/(Place) Locational Type TNC Links Local
Economic Structure
More Modernised:
Brastemp
(Rio Claro)
Consul III
(Joinville)
‘Greenfield’
‘Brownfield’
but separate
Strong / direct
Strong / Direct
Minimal industry /
Some traditional
manufacturing
Moderately important
manufacturing areas
Less modernised:
Enxuta
(Caxias)
Brastemp
(São Bernardo)
Consul II
(Joinville)
New location in old
area
‘Brownfield’
‘Brownfield’
None
Strong/indirect
Strong/indirect
Regionally important
industrial base
Key concentrated
industrial base
Moderately important
manufacturing base
Source: Observation, interviews and secondary data
As shown in Table 1, the case studies showed variety in terms of locational type, their
TNC (Whirlpool) connections and in terms of local economic structure. These features offer
some support for the pessimistic supposition that modernising factories will be located in
‘greenfields’ areas and have stronger TNC links than other firms. The broader study’s
detailed review of modernisation policy and practice illustrates that, in fact, these
characteristics are important to the form of modernisation strategy attempted51.
Tables 2 and 3 below, on the other hand, provide a summary of the key differences
between these firms. The material in these tables illustrates the vast differences in processes
and outcomes at the highly modernised Brastemp-Rio Claro (washing products; Table 3) and
Consul III (refrigeration; Table 2) factories compared to conditions at the other
establishments. Moreover, the following discussion highlights how these two examples would
appear to support many of the characteristics of the optimistic modernisation model52.
                                                          
51 A detailed presentation of these observations can be found in Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisation’, Ch 4.
52 Ibid.
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Table 2: Factory Typologies and Outcomes - Refrigeration
Indicator / Factory Brastemp
São Bernardo
Consul – II Consul – III
Management style
and structures
Relatively hierarchical
and closed
Some reduction in
hierarchies; more
participative
Flat structures, open
relations, quite
participative
Technology,
techniques and layout
Older and not
integrated
Mixed / not integrated New and integrated
Workplace and
human resources
policies
Mainly a wage based
relation / recent
changes
Some new tasks /
training
New tasks, training
and workplace
ambient
Supervision Old / overt Newer style New and open
OUTCOMES:
Productivity =
products per worker
per day
1.7 1.2 2.6
Turnover = % per
annum
8.4 % 6.0 % 1.5 %
Wages = US $ per
month; skill weighted US $ 430 US $ 344 US $ 365
Supervision = % of
factory employment 6.3 % 2.1 % 1.4 %
Skill level:
- % skilled
- % semiskilled
- % unskilled
13 %
12 %
75 %
9 %
11 %
80 %
10 %
30 %
60 %
Table 3: Factory Typologies and Outcomes – Washing Products
Indicator / Factory Brastemp – Rio Claro Enxuta
Management style and
structures
Open and participative Closed, hierarchical –
paternal / recent changes
Technology, techniques and
layout
New, automated and
integrated
Older / less automated  / not
integrated
Workplace and human
resources policies
New tasks, benefits and
opportunities
Few concerns for work
pressure or conditions
Supervision Open / less overt Old style / overt
OUTCOMES*:
Productivity 3.1 1.5
Turnover 2.4 % 1992 - 12.5 % 1993 61.2 %
Wages US $ 253 US $ 292
Supervision 1.7 % 3.8 %
Skill level:
- % skilled
- % semiskilled
- % unskilled
7 %
3 %
90 %
11 %
10 %
79 %
* Outcome measures as shown in Table 2
For example, in terms of management style and structures (row 1, Tables 2-3), these
two firms (and their parent body Multibras/Whirlpool) have promoted a mission statement
and management strategy which reflects the quality, continuous improvement and human
resources principles of TQM and HRM in a classical sense. This strategy goes quite deep
with each firm making significant reductions in reporting hierarchies as well as instigating
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new participative mechanisms, cells and training opportunities. These changes have
accompanied the integration of new process technologies, techniques such as JIT/Kanban
and maintenance/quality procedures.
The nature of skills, employee relations and employment conditions also offer a stark
contrast to the piecemeal changes attempted at the other firms (row 3, Tables 2-3). For
example, while overall skill levels at the firms suggest ambiguous skill effects (row 10, Tables
2-3) due to modernisation, this is mainly due to structural relationships between the
Multibras/Whirlpool firms. In fact, observation confirmed that workers at the two
comprehensively modernised firms have a greater number of new tasks and responsibilities.
In terms of employee relations, workers at the two comprehensively modernised firms
have closer team relations, reduced overt supervision and numerous opportunities to
contribute. These workers also benefit from a very clean, organised ambient and substantial
new training opportunities. At Brastemp-Rio Claro workers also have a shorter working week
and a career scheme, the ultimate level of which would make them a multiskilled, technical
worker.
In terms of outcomes, many of these results also fit the optimistic model (rows 6-9,
Tables 2-3). For example, productivity is much higher at Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III.
Labour turnover is also much lower there. This suggests that greater stability is evident, that
employers can recoup much of their training costs and that workers may be happier to
remain at the firm. Finally, these statistics suggest that direct supervision is in fact much
lower at the comprehensively modernised firms.
However, there are a number of caveats to this picture53. These might suggest that
these firms have not opened up possibilities (and their dependence) to the degree suggested
above. For example, ‘greenfields’ or low wage location has allowed them to offer wages
which are low on industry standards but adequate for their local labour markets (row 8,
Tables 2-3). Secondly, both of these firms have instigated extensive selection criteria and
training programmes which do not closely match cognitive abilities to perform tasks. Workers
at each firm are intensively ‘trained’ and screened in relation to attitudes to the employer and
industrial disputation, ‘what is quality’, the ‘importance of the firm' etc. Workers there are also
much younger (25 vs 35 years) than at the other firms and perhaps more malleable to a firm
based view.
At Brastemp-Rio Claro the qualitative nature of the labour use model is the most
highly developed. For example, their career scheme awards skills, training and attitudes and
workers are involved in the evaluation of their teammates. It is not hard to imagine that this
would be difficult and divisive for workers while at the same time make it easier for the firm to
relinquish some of its former direct supervision functions54.
Supporting this greater internal control interpretation is the observation that, at
Joinville, Consul (and Whirlpool) went to great lengths to replace the combative local union
with a passive one. Overall Brazilian Whirlpool production has been progressively moved
away from Brastemp-São Bernardo (a key area of high wages and union militancy) to
Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul-Joinville (one a ‘greenfield’ site and the other with a passive
union). It appears to be of no coincidence that Whirlpool’s purchase of Consul, Brastemp
(and Embraco – the key input supplier company) has allowed the group to minimise unions,
disputation and wages in this way.
                                                          
53 Ibid.
54 Even greater support for the degree of managerial perogative involved can also be seen from the fact that the
firm was easily able to put the career scheme on hold (due to their concerns about  wage growth) in 1998 and
reinstitute it in 2001.
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Attitudes to work confirm these negative suggestions in terms of employer
dependence and control55. For example, Consul II workers feel much less monitored and
more interested in their work than do their counterparts in Consul III where overt monitoring
is much less and tasks are ‘new’. Brastemp-Rio Claro workers, on the other hand, feel
particularly negative about work pressures. Overall, attitudes to work do not suggest that
most comprehensive firm workers are any happier about their work or that they have any
greater opportunities for progress than do workers at the other firms.
In summary, this review has confirmed that there are instances of comprehensive
modernisation in the Brazilian context. However, these firms appear to be developing
stronger internal control mechanisms and external barriers so that their dependence on the
skills and attitudes of their workers is minimised and so that external threats to this are
contained or avoided. Thus if the optimistic modernisation argument holds any credence it
must be based on a stronger degree of worker allegiance to the employer. If this is the case,
the apparent continuation of low trust, adversarial industrial relations in Brazil would suggest
that this may have particularly negative implications for workers’ attitudes to the union. The
last section of this paper turns to these questions.
5.0 THE ‘AXIS’ OF WORKER ALLEGIANCE
The history of Brazilian workplace relations, while often paternalistic, would appear to
suggest that workers have good reasons not to have much trust in employers. The
unrepresentative nature of many unions during much of the 20th century also suggests that
most workers will have little faith in unions’ desire or ability to improve their working lives.
However, general questions put to the sample suggest that the firm has become a strong
referent for workers and that the union remains of minimal interest to most workers56.
For example, 52% of the sample felt the firm had most power to determine their
livelihood whereas 38% mentioned the state. In terms of ‘in whom they have most
confidence for the determination of their livelihood’, 78% mentioned the firm, 16% others
(including unions) and 6% the state57. As these results appear to support the optimistic
modernisation argument, the following two subsections examine these apparently ‘employer
positive – union negative’ opinions in greater detail.
5.1 The Modern Employer – The Nature of Worker Allegiance
A number of the samples’ responses suggest that the comprehensively modernising
employer has been able to obtain a much firmer orientated workforce. For example, while
regional wage comparisons may also be at play, workers at the low wage Brastemp-Rio
Claro are happiest with pay (Table 4, row 1). More clearly, workers at the two
comprehensively modernised firms feel most positive about their overall compensation
(Table 4, row 2). That the comprehensively modernised firms have been able to obtain a
workforce that is more firm focussed is also confirmed by workers’ responses to a question
about what determines their desire to leave or stay (Table 4, row 3).
                                                          
55 Pegler, ‘Politics of Modernisation’, Ch 5.
56 Ibid., p 221.
57Ibid.
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Table 4: Satisfaction with Employer policies
Question Key Responses
Are you adequately
paid?
Sample = 44 % yes
Highest positive response by firm – Brastemp – Rio Claro (60%)
Your work is well
compensated overall?
Sample = 60 % yes
Highest positive response by firm – the two comprehensive
modernisers (76 % - 83 %; Pr = 0.056)
Probability of
(voluntary) stability
depends on….?
Sample = 84 % conditions at firm, 27 % outside opportunities also.
Comprehensive moderniser workers – greatest emphasis on
developments at current firm
Partial moderniser workers – less emphasis on developments at
current firm (Pr = 0.082)
Source: Worker interviews
However, it is also clear that many workers have not gained much as yet (Table 5,
row 1) and that the higher skill groups have high expectations of future gains (Table 5, row
2).  Factory observation and other responses confirm that many workers are sceptical about
what they have or will gain from the modernised firm58. For example, opportunities to
participate are highly geared to firm based issues (vs benefits), ‘training’ may not make them
more employable generally and career expectations (at Brastemp-Rio Claro) remain just that.
Workers at the highly modernised Consul III are not at all happy that less productive workers
at Consul II gain the same pay rates.
Table 5: Impressions and Expectations of Gains
Question Key Responses
What have you gained from
the firm?
Sample – 47 % much, 53 % little – nil
Skilled / semiskilled more satisfied than unskilled (Pr =
0.000)
What do you expect to gain
from the firm?
Sample – 35 % much, 21 % little to nothing
Skilled / semiskilled have high expectations – unskilled have
low expectations (Pr = 0.040)
Source: Worker interviews
On the other hand, even the partial level of modernisation at the more traditional firms
has led to the generalised opinion that the firm has more interest in workers than in the past
(Table 6, row 1). Yet most workers (67%; Table 6, row 2) saw this as having a clear relation
to a desire for greater profitability. What stands out within these responses is that Brastemp-
Rio Claro workers appeared to have a more altruistic view of their firm’s intentions but that
workers’ responses at the other comprehensively modernised firm (Consul III) did not agree.
Combined with earlier comments about attitudes to work, pay and monitoring (at Consul III),
this would suggest that if the optimistic hypothesis about attitudes to the employer works it
only does so at one of the most modernised firms, Brastemp-Rio Claro.
Table 6: Belief in the Firm’s Interest in Workers
Question Key Responses
Firm has more interest in
workers now?
Sample = 70 % yes
Highest positive response by firm – Brastemp – Rio Claro
and Consul II (76 %)
Why does the firm have more
interest? (profit or altruistic
emphasis?
Sample = 67 % mainly due to profit
Greatest belief in altruism by firm – Brastemp – Rio Claro
and Consul II (Pr = 0.029)
Source: Worker interviews
                                                          
58 Fully discussed in Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisation’, Ch 5.4, pp 201-211.
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Nevertheless, other indicators question even this modified result for workers’ attitudes
at the modernised firm. For example, preference rankings for workers suggested that career
opportunity and participation were, along with pay, key issues59. However, at the
comprehensively modernised firms, where cellular relations and a career scheme operate
(Brastemp-Rio Claro), workers are very unhappy with evaluation (Table 7, row 1).
Even though they work within more open and transparent evaluation systems, these
workers still judge evaluation as biased to education and training (vs ability) and too
subjective. At Brastemp-Rio Claro, in particular, workers appear very unhappy that this
process uses peer pressure. Taking this suggestion of dissatisfaction with the employer to a
more general level, it is very significant that most workers at Brastemp-Rio Claro and many
of those at Consul III are just as likely to leave their firm voluntarily as are workers at the very
oppressive Enxuta factory (Table 7, row 2).
The recent arrival of other comprehensively modernised firms in the Rio Claro locality
may add to this pessimistic result for the attitudes of Brastemp-Rio Claro workers to their
employer. This is because these new firms are offering much higher (metals industry based
vs local labour market) wages. This development may therefore also change the previously
positive views of Brastemp-Rio Claro workers as to their employer’s wage policies (Table 4)
Table 7: Satisfaction with Evaluation and Probability of Voluntary Turnover
Question Key Responses
Like the (promotional) evaluation system Workers from two most comprehensively
modernised firms don’t like (80 % and above)
Partial moderniser workers do like (55 % –
60 %) – (Pr = 0.012)
Expect to (voluntarily) leave firm in next 2
years?
Sample – 28 % yes
Most Enxuta and Brastemp – Rio Claro
workers and 50 % of Consul III workers much
more likely to leave (Pr = 0.004)
Source: Worker interviews
The above results in respect to attitudes to the employer question the proposition that
even ‘passive’ Brazilian workers will develop allegiance to the modernised employer.
Workers’ views seem very instrumental and may vary by issue. Overall, acquiescence or ‘as
if’ allegiance might be better terms to use for attitudes to an employer who is putting more
and new expectations on them.
While recognising that unions may have new and greater difficulties ‘penetrating’ the
human resource and industrial relations framework which these firms are trying to build,
might this suggest that workers have a latent demand for greater union representation? If so,
what form should this take? The following subsection summarises the samples’ attitudes to
the union – both now and for the future.
5.2 Unions as a ‘Voice’ – Workers’ Views and Expectations
As is clear from Table 8 below, there is great variety in the degree of unionism
between these firms60. The high level of unionism at Brastemp-São Bernardo reflects the
powerful and influential role of that union, both within local workplaces and more generally.
                                                          
59 Ibid., pp 180-184.
60 These figures relate to additional, voluntary union membership not the compulsory union tax that is removed
from all workers wages to support union structures.
16
Internal disputes and the lack of a clear workplace role have left unionism at Enxuta at very
low levels. On the other hand, unionism is very low at the comprehensively modernised,
‘greenfields’, Brastemp-Rio Claro site.
Table 8: The Nature of Unionism, by sample and firm61
Union Type Non Member Passive Member Active Member
Sample:      53%       32%      15%
By Firm:
Rio Claro
Enxuta
São Bernardo
Consul II
Consul III
Consul Total
     84%
     70%
     12%
     47%
     50%
     48%
      16%
      30%
      56%
      23%
      33%
      26%
      -
      -
     32%
     30%
     17%
     26%
Source: Interview data
More surprisingly, unionism is high at both Consul factories. While this may seem to
conflict with a pessimistic interpretation of the modernisation process it may be explained by
two observations. First, as alluded to earlier,  two months after a radical group gained control
of the local union (the Mecânicos) in 1989 the company successfully replaced it with a very
passive (service, not workplace orientated) union (Sinditherme). Moreover, while both firms
have high unionisation rates, it appears to be active union attachment which separates the
factories and the selection of workers for factory III  (Table 8, row 2 ).
Nevertheless, unionisation statistics can tell us only so much about workers’ attitudes.
The views of all workers within the sample can be used to more specifically test the
suggested links between modernisation and attitudes to the union and unionism. The
following discussion of attitudinal indicators confirms the view that context and union strategy
will have a strong impact on whether modernisation is able to shape workers’ attitudes in the
way theory suggests.
First, as summarised in Table 9, the more modernised the firm the less aware are
workers of the union’s policies (row 1). A large proportion (71%) of the sample, particularly at
the comprehensive firms, also felt that the union was not a good one (row 2). A similar
question about attitudes to the union’s policies supported this opinion62. It would therefore
appear that these firms have achieved (by persuasion and/or selection) a less union
orientated workforce.
Table 9: Awareness of Union Policy and Overall Assessment of the Union
Question Key Responses
Are you aware of your local unions’
policies?
Sample – 80 % yes
By firm – the more modernised the least aware
(PR = 0.001)
Is the local union good? Sample – 71 % not good
Comprehensive modernisers – the most negative
(Pr = 0.000)
Consul II response (50/50) much different to
Consul III (100 % no)
Source: Worker interviews
                                                          
61 Active/passive unionism are self defined. Passive refers solely to the use of union services whereas active
relates to other, more political relations with the union.
62 Ibid., pp 243-244.
17
However, the result at the Consul factories is an ambiguous one (Table 9, row 2).
This and other (see below) responses suggest that the supposedly passive Consul III sample
may be more negative about their (passive) union (Sinditherme) than their counterparts in
Consul II. Alternatively, or in addition to this, perhaps many Consul II workers still think in
terms of their older, more active union (the Mecânicos).
Nevertheless, workers’ awareness of the very different orientations of their unions
was clearly reflected in their views about what they felt their unions’ policies were – 30%
nothing, 19% workplace issues and 51% a traditional (wage and service) orientation63.
Moreover, cross tabulated responses for the sample as a whole suggest that there was a
clear endorsement that, if the union had active workplace policies it was more likely to be
judged as good (Table 10).
Table 10: Impressions of the Union based on its Policy Approach, key responses
Combined questions Key Responses
Local unions’ policies are / union is
good?
Sample – union is more likely to be judged as good if
it is seen as having workplace/labour process policies
(Pr = 0.000)
Local unions’ policies are / unions
policies are good?
Sample – union seen to have labour process policies
is more likely have its policies liked uncategorically
(Pr = 0.000)
Source:  Worker Interviews - cross-tabulated responses.
Following this, what then would the union have to do to gain greater support from
workers (whether they are presently union members or not)? In this regard, for the sample
overall it appears that many workers believe the union should do more. More than 60% of the
sample felt that their union should be involved in workplace issues (Table 11).  Nearly half of the
sample also felt that the union did not yet have, but should have, clear policies focussed on the
workplace (Table 12, row 2).
Table 11: Policy Expectations of the Union
Question Key Responses
What policies should the union have? Sample – 65 % workplace / labour process issues;
23 % traditional issues, 12 % ‘nothing’
By Firm:
Brastemp – Rio Claro – significant number said
‘nothing’ (33 %; Pr = 0.012)
Consul III – 100 % said workplace / labour process
issues
Consul II – 70 % workplace / labour process, 30 %
traditional
Source: Worker interviews
Table 12: Impressions of what Union’s Policies are/should be
Question/Response Union policies should be
based on the workplace.
Union should have traditional
policies only.
Union policies are focussed on
the workplace. 17.5 % of respondents 6% of respondents
Unions policies are focussed
on traditional issues. 48% of respondents 16.5% of  respondents
Source: Cross-tabulated from responses.
                                                          
63 Ibid.
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While the view of Consul workers overall supports this, it appears that Consul III
workers are particularly unhappy with the lack of a (critical) workplace approach by their
passive union (Table 11). On the other hand, Consul II workers feel that their union should
do more about both traditional and workplace issues (Table 11).  In fact, a fairly typical view
of Consul workers was confirmed by the sentiment ‘union?… we don’t have a union here. If
you complain to the union here you are out on the street the next day!64’
Most striking is the fact that workers at the comprehensive ‘greenfields’ site
(Brastemp-Rio Claro) are unhappy with their local union (Tables 9, 11) but not too negative
about unions in general. Many felt that ‘unions are important…they protect workers.. but not
here, they are not needed here’65. Thus, in contrast to the other firms it appears that
management at Brastemp-Rio Claro has had most success in achieving a workforce which
(while often believing in unions in general) has few attachments to their local union. All other
workers within the sample clearly want a local union with an active and questioning approach
to workplace change.
This suggestion of workers’ latent desires for a more active, independent union
receives a degree of support from other responses. For example, 55% of the sample felt that
the union should strike – either over some or an unlimited range of issues (Table 13, row 1).
Also, confirming the suggestion that some workers at comprehensively modernised firms are
not happy with passive unionism, workers at Consul III registered a more militant and strike
positive attitude than their workmates in Consul II (Table 13, row 1).  Moreover, the fact that
55% of the sample saw some need for strikes but only 47% were unionised (Table 8) adds
weight to these latent desires. This gains further support from the fact that 37% of the sample
felt both that the union as not good and that some type of strike action should be pursued
(Table 13, row 2).
Table 13: Assessing the Union on Strike Action, key responses
Questions Key Responses
When should a union
consider striking?
1) Sample – 45% never, 31% over wages, 24% over any issue in
dispute.
2) Two most traditional firms workers – most unrestricted (Pr =
0.019)
3) Workers from comprehensively modernised Consul III evenly
divided on three views and more strike positive than Consul II
workers (65% of whom said never)
Union is good / when
should strike?
Sample – 37% union not good/should consider strike action.
Source: Worker interviews
In summary, management at the ultra modern Brastemp-Rio Claro has achieved a
workforce which, while often positive about unions in general, does not feel they need a
union at their particular site. Yet whether this reticence to be aligned to the union gives
reason to suggest the emergence of employer allegiance remains in question. Outside of
such ‘greenfields’ situations, it appears that if a union is both independent and actively
involved in workplace matters they may not loose worker support. The responses of workers
at the other sites (both traditional and highly modernised) suggests that there may even be a
chance that workers will increase their attachment to, and support of, a union of this type.
                                                          
64 Consul worker interview, CONII14 – Ibid., p 256.
65 Brastemp-Rio Claro worker interview, RCL 18 – Ibid., p 255.
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6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The evidence reviewed within this study allows a number of reflections to be made
about the issues of employer dependence and worker allegiance in the Brazilian context.
First, while there are a growing number of examples of comprehensive modernisation in
Brazil, this study suggests that such firms will react to the prospect that they will become
more dependent on the skills and attitudes of their workers with a variety of policies. Within
the firm, new forms of worker control have been developed or refined. ‘Greenfields’ location
may greatly assist this process. In terms of union influence, traditional policies of union
avoidance/minimisation have been added to by the message - ‘why are they needed when
conditions within the “family of the firm” are so good’. The application of this unitarist HRM
model within the present Brazilian industrial relations context makes it highly unlikely that
dual allegiance to both employer and union will be of much significance.
Secondly, despite this pessimistic setting, the evidence suggests that workers can be
persuaded to think in terms of an effort bargain which includes issues beyond just
remuneration. Many workers are also positive about this in principle and, consequently,
those at the most modernised firms are taking a more firm based approach. However, as
with workers’ attitudes to many of the new aspects of their work, their degree of attachment
to the firm is limited. Most workers are unhappy about aspects of their relationship with the
firm (e.g. evaluation) while many continue to wait for ‘future’ gains. Due to such uncertainties,
the probability that workers at the most modernised firms will voluntarily remain with their
present firm is no greater than that for workers at the more traditional firms.
Thirdly, in terms of the worker-union relation, the cynicism of Brazilian workers to
unions may have been heightened by the policies of the comprehensively modernising firm.
The union’s ‘electorate’ remains very sceptical and may even have shifted its priorities.
However, part of this result may be due to the anti-union policies of the firms rather than due
to the persuasive effect of internal policies per se. Moreover, despite low levels of unionism
(or active unionism) at the more modernised firms, many workers are fairly positive about
unionism and strikes. Yet, in such cases, support for the local union is conditional on union
policies being directed towards the promotion of workers’ key workplace concerns.
Fourthly, while these specific results are influenced by the Brazilian context they do
raise questions about the attitudinal and behavioural underpinnings of modernisation in any
context. Workers’ needs appear to be very practical and instrumental and their ‘allegiance’
may change by issue and over time. As long as employers act to minimise the risk to which
they may become more dependent on workers, employee behaviour will, at best, only appear
to indicate that they have more allegiance to the employer. Moreover, outside of the most
isolated ‘greenfields site, the latent concerns of many workers suggest that unions may not
become more ineffectual and irrelevant -  if they cleverly develop new and active strategies
for labourers at the workplace.
Finally, at a more conceptual level, these results offer much more support for a labour
process perspective than they do for the optimistic hypothesis. A Burawoy type approach –
particularly when new, more subtle forms of control are taken into account – seems most
applicable. Within this perspective, agency and context (including the role of TNCs, union
strategies and industrial relations norms) can play an important role in determining the form
and effects of modernisation.
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